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RECENT DECISIONS
pliance with the Counselvwn decision, and can be used to compel
a witness to answer.
It would appear that witnesses will be afforded equally-wide
protection from state prosecution, since the new statute retains
the phrase "in any court." Whether this further interference
with state powers raises a constitutional question not answered by
the instant case remains to be seen.
Eileen Tomaka
FEDERAL PROCEDURE - SUBSTITUTION OF A PUBLIC
OFFICIAL UNDER RULE 25 (d) OF THE FEDERAL
RULES OF C1IL PROCEDURE
Petitioner unsuccessfully sought to compel the return of docu-
ments illegally seized and now held by the United States Attorney.
The United States Attorney retired, and the court refused to sub-
stitute his successor in office on the grounds that this would be an
exercise of original jurisdiction over a new party and a new cause.
Danenberg v. Cohen, 213 F. 2d 944 (7th Cir. 1954).
At common law, an action against a public official abated with
his death or retirement from office and could not be revived against
his successor without statutory authority. In the very cases in
which the Supreme Court recognized this principle, it also recog-
nized the inexpedience of the rule and urged the enactment of
remedial statutory authority. United States ex rel Bernardin v.
Butterworth, 169 U. S. 600 (1898) ; Ex Parte La Prade, 289 U. S.
444 (1933).
In response to this judicial prompting, Congress enacted Rule
25 (d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides
for substitution against a successor in office when "a substantial
need for so continuing is satisfactorily shown." The dearth of
cases interpreting "substantial need" necessitates a review of the
Bernardin and La Prade cases, for an indication of judicial inter-
pretation of "substantial need." In the Bernardin case the peti-
tioner requested a writ of mandamus to force the successor in office
to the head of the Patent Bureau to issue him a patent. The
La Prade case was a suit against The Attorney General of Arizona
to enjoin the enforcement of a statute relating to the size of rail-
road trains. In both cases the Court was forced to refuse sub-
stitution of their successors solely because of the absence, at that
time, of statutory authority. A case decided after the enactment
of statutory authority allowed substitution of a United States tax
collector in a suit to enjoin an unconstitutional collection of an
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amusement tax on its football games and held the case to be within
the letter of the act. Allen v. Regents of the University of Georgia,
304 U. S. 439 (1938).
Rule 41 (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure has
been interpreted to the effect that an aggrieved party can sup-
press illegally seized evidence not only in advance of trial but also
in advance of indictment. This liberal construction is rational-
ized by recognizing the harm wrought by a wrongful indictment,
even if it does not result in a conviction. In Re Fried, 161 F. 2d 453(2d Cir. 1947). Another theory allows suppression in advance of
indictment because the court may reach forward to control the
presentation of evidence that may come before it. Foley v. United
States, 64 F. 2d 1 (5th Cir. 1933).
Although Rule 41 (e) would seem to be the best method avail-
able, this rule does not purport or otherwise appear to be an ex-
clusive remedy; for the doctrine rests on and is inseparably tied
up with the property right of the person from whom the article is
taken. Foley v. United States, supra.
It would seem to follow that the present case "falls within the
letter and spirit of Rule 25 (d)", and substitution should be al-
lowed as a matter of course. The attitude of the court seems to
evince a tacit desire to delimit and narrowly confine the sup-
pression and return of illegally seized property to the exact
remedy afforded by Rule 41 (e) of The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. If this be the unarticulated ground for the court's
dismissal, it is deplorable that a defendant should be deprived
of his substantive rights by a mis-application of procedure.
Howard L. Meyer, II
LABOR LAW -RETAIL STORE OWNER MAY DENY
UNION OPPORTUNITY TO REPLY TO
PRE-ELECTION SPEECH
Employer, variety store, addressed its employees on company
time and on company property, exhorting them to vote against
the union in the coming election. Requests by the union for an
opportunity to address the employees under similar circumstances
were refused. The N. L. R. B. found that the employer's refusal
constituted discriminatory application of its no-solicitation rule.
In a proceeding on petition for enforcement of a cease and desist
order, Held (2-1): Employer is not required to provide equal op-
portunity to union representatives to speak to employees on the
premises and during working hours. N. L. R. B. v. F. W. Wool-
worth Co., 214 F. 2d 78 (6th Cir. 1954).
